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Rapture or Risk: Signs of the End or Symptoms of World Risk Society? 
 
Abstract 
In this article I argue that elements of contemporary fundamentalist Christian apocalyptic 
discourse are not only influenced by, but are a product of the rhetoric and fascination with the 
notion of risk. The world risk society thesis developed by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck 
will be utilised as a conceptual framework to measure one example of an online discourse 
centred on a Christian dispensationalist understanding of the rapture: Rapture Index. This 
popular website utilises a statistical probability index system based on 45 different categories 
that relate to global socio-political events; the higher the aggregate total the nearer the 
rapture. The Rapture Index is indebted to the impact of risk in contemporary society and it is a 
tool that exemplifies non-knowing: a product of the world risk society. 
Keywords: Beck, world risk society, apocalypse, fundamentalism, dispensationalism, digital 
media.  
Introduction 
Threats to human existence and the associated insecurities, fears and anxieties that 
accompany such threats have cast a long shadow over humanity. In the not too distant past to 
take a risk often equated to challenging the gods or God. Thus, knowledge of anticipated 
events was usually the domain of oracles or soothsayers (Bernstein 1998: 1). However, with 
the advancement of new and emerging technologies and the insatiable progress of science, 
the boundary between superstition and rational assessment of potential risks has seemingly 
been crossed.  The rapid developments characteristic of late modern western society has led 
to Anthony Giddens (1999: 2) arguing that we live on the barbaric outer edge of modern 
technology. Indeed, as Robert Wuthnow (2010: 1) writes: ‘For more than six decades, 
  
humankind has lived with the knowledge that it could be the agent of its own annihilation.’ 
As a result, the impact of the accession of new technology means that we are both pre-
occupied with the future and with negating risk produced through such rapid modernisation.  
It also reveals our lack of knowledge: that which we do not know. In other words, we 
do not know the side effects of advancement in science and technology. The invention of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is a good example. Extensively used within the refrigeration 
industry (post World War Two) and hailed as a breakthrough chemical for this market, the 
side effects of its extensive use were not revealed until the 1970s: depletion of the ozone 
layer. As a result heavy regulation now polices the use of it.1 Lack of clear knowledge of 
such outcomes in the midst of technological and scientific progress is disturbingly prevalent 
in contemporary society. There are of course positives that assist in anticipating such side 
effects. Developments in computer technology enable huge data sets to be analysed and 
probability statistics generated in ways not previously conceived that calculate the likelihood 
of risks becoming catastrophes (Lupton 2013: 16; Blastland and Spiegelhalter 2013).  
The emergence of risk has led to the increase of ontological instability and existential 
angst, due mainly to its connotation with negative outcomes (Lupton 2013: 9). This is ironic 
given that an intensification of the quest to quash existential insecurity has been a prominent 
feature of modernity (Bauman, 1991). Consequently, the pervasiveness of risk in late 
modernity has provided fertile ground for the growth of new religion-making characteristics 
in contemporary society (van Harskamp 2008: 1; Lyon 1999, 2000; Carrette and King 2004). 
An unintended consequence of the wider sociological impact of risk in late modernity has 
been the significant growth of fundamentalisms, religious or otherwise, particularly post-
World War Two (Marty and Appleby 1991; Bauman 1998).  After examining the notion of 
risk, primarily through the work of Ulrich Beck, the focus will turn to one example of 
Christian fundamentalism: the Christian dispensationalist eschatology that is presented on the 
  
webpage Rapture Index.2 In what follows the case will be made that this specific 
eschatological doctrine has been significantly influenced by the sociological ramifications of 
risk to the point that it is a mutation of what is regarded as traditional dispensationalism.   
  
Late Modernity is World Risk Society 
The last 50 years has witnessed increasing scholarly attention on the study of risk with a 
number of critical theories being developed that attempt to articulate reasons for the 
proliferation of the language and concept of risk in contemporary society (e.g., Beck 1992, 
2009; Giddens 1991, 2002; Douglas 1970; Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). But why should 
this be the case when, in western society, life expectancy has risen, cures have been found for 
disease, infant mortality is down and wealth is more prevalent (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 
2)? Some scholars have argued that contemporary risk is not unlike that of previous eras and 
that there is little empirical evidence for the claim that risk is any different now than it has 
been previously (Elliott 2002; Turner 1994). Others suggest that the debates about risk have 
exaggerated anxieties in societies (Furedi 2006); whilst some argue that risks offer 
opportunities rather than threats (Luhmann 1993) and are part and parcel of the forces of 
successful economics and innovation (Giddens 1998).  
Such differences contribute to the notion of risk being regarded as a notoriously 
slippery term (Mythen 2004: 54). The approach of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck is to 
define risk by differentiating it with the notion of catastrophe; the two are not synonymous. 
Rather, ‘risk means the anticipation of the catastrophe. Risk concerns the possibility of future 
occurrences and developments’ (Beck 2009: 9) and highlights what might be possible. When 
the possibilities become reality they are catastrophes.  
 
  
Taking a critical realist approach, Beck (Beck 2009: 7) argues that risk is not an 
anthropological constant as others such as Mary Douglas have argued. For instance, he 
contends that contemporary risks are not the same as that of a pre-industrial period which 
where geographically and temporally contained; rather, present-day risks are not limited to 
time, space, or particular societies.3 Contemporary risk is qualitatively different from pre-
industrial risk.4 Pre-industrial risks and hazards ‘assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus 
perceptible to the senses, while the risks of civilisation today typically escape perception…’ 
(Beck 1992: 21). Understood as low probability but with high consequences, there is a radical 
unknowability to these risks which are now global in nature (Beck 1992, 1995, 2009; 
Giddens 1991, 2002; Douglas 1992).  
Beck posits that the present epoch—late (or second) modernity—is more accurately 
termed world risk society (2009).5 The expectations of society are in some form determined 
by the vulnerability toward risk which is translated through political force. Zygmunt 
Bauman’s (2011: 53) suggestion that the foundations of political power are found in human 
uncertainty and vulnerability ring ominously true here. World risk society has spawned three 
principle logics of risk that Beck (Beck 2009: 13) outlines: ecological risk, global financial 
risk and terrorist threats. Further risks reside in the ‘biographical risks closely connected with 
the dynamics of individualization’ (2009: 13). This fourth dimension plays a pivotal role in 
the development and perception of the other three and is also central to what Beck terms the 
theory of reflexive modernization.  
Beck (1992: 21) writes, ‘The concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of 
reflexive modernisation. Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards 
and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.’ Reflexive modernisation 
refers to the process whereby institutions and individuals confront and evaluate decisions in 
the light of manufactured risks and alterations to social structures and accordingly try to 
  
avoid potential catastrophe (side effects/unintended consequences). Along with the concept 
of risk reflexive modernisation is also intrinsically bound to theories of globalisation and 
individualisation. Dealing primarily with the latter, contemporary western societies have 
witnessed a change in social and political forms that have traditionally acted as structures that 
support lives shaped within nation-states. This re-shaping, and often withdrawal, of structures 
and services has increasingly led to, what Beck argues as, radical individualisation. Beck 
(1994: 13) states, ‘Individualization… means, first, the disembedding and, second, the re-
embedding of industrial society ways of life by new ones, ones in which the individuals must 
produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves.’  
Social processes and cultural values influence the extent to which anxiety and fear 
contribute to existential angst. The notion of individualisation in a world risk society forces 
people to make their own choices in a period that is undergoing rapid social change: a world 
that is in the midst of technology-induced globalisation (Castells 2010). This, in turn, 
engenders an intensified anxiety. As Frank Furedi (2006: 28) notes, ‘The perception of being 
at risk expresses a pervasive mood in society; one that influences action in general.’  
This view is not without its critics. Furlong and Cartmel argue that this represents an 
epistemological fallacy, as they understand it to be an exaggeration of the ‘over-estimation of 
the extent to which individuals are able to construct their identities’ (2007: 143). They reject 
the claim that traditional social divisions are less powerful now than they once were in 
determining life chances; however, they accept Beck’s argument that as a result of the 
processes of late modernity collective social identities are considerably weakened (2007: 
143). Fear is a driver in the search for existential answers to our interrogations which do no 
more than, in turn, perpetuate those same fears in a society that is over-shadowed by risk. The 
throwing back of these social processes onto the individual is a contributing factor to the 
  
proliferation of communities of resistance (Castells 2010: 8). A consequence of this is the 
growth of fundamentalisms (Bauman 1998; Lyon 1999, 2000). 
 
The growth of fundamentalism 
John Thompson (1996: 89) writes, ‘One of the most powerful legacies of classical social 
thought is the idea that, with the development of modern societies, tradition gradually 
declines in significance and eventually ceases to play a meaningful role in the lives of 
individuals.’ This is true up to a point. Tradition was subject to severe criticism throughout 
the period of the Enlightenment, and understood as a thing of the past that stood in the way of 
modernity’s incessant rational march forward; but despite this tradition did not go away 
(Giddens 2002: 44). Instead, tradition has come to be understood and utilised differently. 
Moreover, the Enlightenment assault on tradition can itself be regarded as a tradition (Adam 
1996). The loss of the influence of tradition and the so-called process of detraditionalisation 
is due, in part, to the contemporary world being increasingly reliant upon patterns of 
contingency. Contingency by definition does not offer certainty; rather, so-called certainties 
are replaced by the shifting reflexivity of societies having to deal with the unintended 
consequences of progress (Beck 2009). Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2000: 164) remarks that ‘one 
need only observe, sociologically speaking, our late twentieth-century generation, the first 
post-traditional generation, is the first to find itself in a situation of structural uncertainty 
symptomized by the mobility, reversibility and transferability of all markers.’ Although this 
statement exaggerates the current climate in terms of just how post traditional society is, 
Hervieu-Léger is correct in recognising the uncertainty of our times. This has led not only to 
crises of identity that in an age of globalisation leads to national resurgence (Castells 2010: 
  
30) but to the re-affirming of communities, including religious ones who robustly defend 
tradition, as well as the birth of new religiosities.    
One of the outcomes of the accelerated processes of globalisation and the retreat of 
tradition has been the growth of fundamentalism (Marsden 1991; Riesebrodt 1993). The label 
fundamentalism is contentious and controversial (Marty and Appleby 1991: viii; Davie 2013; 
Partridge 2002; Bruce 2007) partly due to its protean nature which has led Martin Marty to 
speak about fundamentalisms in the Wittgensteinian sense of ‘family resemblances’ (1991: 
ix).6 That is, there are sufficient resonances and commonalities to describe groups as 
fundamentalist without falling into a rigid definition that becomes too simplistic (Strozier and 
Terman 2010: 1).    
Laurence Kaplin’s (1992: 5) definition is that ‘fundamentalism can be described as a 
world view that highlights specific essential “truths” of traditional faiths and applies them 
with earnestness and fervor to twentieth-century realities.’ The reference to essential truths is 
key. In a world that is seemingly distracted by the uncertainties of modern life and the 
associated anxiety that accompanies it, essential truths are under threat. As such they must be 
defended in a world risk society where contingency and doubt pervade the cultural ferment. 
Fundamentalism can be understood as a heuristic cure to the effects of rapid modernisation 
(Mitszel and Shupe 1992: 5). Manuel Castells (2010: 68) writes that key features among the 
cultural communes of fundamentalists, or communities of resistance, are that ‘they appear as 
a reaction to prevailing social trends, which are resisted on behalf of autonomous sources of 
meaning. They are, at the onset, defensive identities that function as refuge and solidarity, to 
protect against a hostile, outside world.’ The Rapture Index, a probability scale designed by a 
Christian fundamentalist to predict the immanence of the rapture of believers in Christ,7 not 
only exemplifies some of the characteristics described by Castells, but also betrays the 
influence of the rhetoric of risk and particularly the notion of world risk society.   
  
 
The Rapture Index: history and background 
With the emergence of the Internet as an indispensable multi-media platform numerous 
websites have emerged which focus almost entirely on eschatology and related aspects of the 
end times. Reputably one of the most popular end time prophecy websites,8 the Rapture Index 
was the original name for the website now known as Rapture Ready. The site was founded in 
1989 by Todd Strandberg, an employee of the US Air Force from Nebraska with no formal 
theological training. In an autobiographical piece on Rapture Ready, Strandberg regales that 
it was his fascination with international current affairs from an early age coupled with his 
interest in bible prophecy that led to the creation of the Rapture Index. In Strandberg’s words, 
I started the index when I noticed how wide-ranging different prophecy commentators’ 
observations were regarding the sign of the times. The Index was designed to 
standardize the most watched prophetic signs and to determine whether end-time trends 
were occurring.9  
In 1995, Rapture Index became part of Rapture Ready because, according Strandberg, ‘the 
word index fails to show up on most internet word searches.’10 In the 18 years since its 
inception, the host site Rapture Ready has grown exponentially. The home page alone has 
over 180 links which are regularly updated that pertain to end time related themes11 and 
include the following: advice on bible prophecy interpretation: a bulletin board; a tribulation 
survival guide; articles on how geo-political events relate to eschatology; an apologetics 
section and a who’s who of bible prophecy experts. Indications of commercial growth are 
also evident with the presence of a Rapture Ready radio and TV station as well as adverts for 
rapture wallpaper, new related publications, an iPhone rapture app as well as a donations link. 
The email contacts of the two Rapture Ready elites are listed on the site home page: 
  
Strandberg, who is described as the ‘fearless leader and founder of RR’, and Terry James: 
‘The general editor and cat lover. As a gifted speaker, Terry does most of the site’s media 
interviews.’12 Both have numerous bible prophecy articles listed on the web site. James is a 
prolific author in his own right, and has published in excess of 35 books on bible prophecy. 
Included in this list is a volume co-authored with Strandberg entitled Are You Rapture 
Ready? Signs, Prophecies, Warnings, and Suspicions that the Endtime is Now (2003). 
Interestingly, the forward for this is written by Tim LaHaye, co-author of the enormously 
successful Left Behind series. Having this endorsement is significant given the power and 
influence LaHaye has wielded socially and politically within the American evangelical right 
over the last 40 years.13 
The core doctrinal position of the web site is best described broadly as dispensational. 
Dispensationalism is part of a group of beliefs that can be categorised as millennialist, which 
is, in the words of Catherine Wessinger (2011: 3), ‘the audacious human hope that in the 
imminent future there will be a transition—either catastrophic or progressive—to a collective 
salvation.’ John Nelson Derby (1800-1882)14 is generally regarded as one of the most 
influential figures in formulating the classical15 version of dispensationalism which has the 
following central tenets: God deals with humankind through a number of dispensations or 
administrations (seven); each has a different means of salvation, but each one ends in human 
failure and the advent of a new dispensation; the teaching of a secret rapture—Christ 
returning to take up believers with him,16 which can happen at any moment prior to a 
tribulation period (and prior to the actual second coming of Christ). It is significant to note 
that Derby never equated contemporary events with biblical prophecy. As Ernest Sandeen 
(1978: 64) notes, ‘Derby avoided the pitfalls both of attempting to predict a time for Christ’s 
second advent and of trying to make sense out of the contemporary alarms of European 
politics with the Revelation as his guidebook.’ The dispensationalist theology presented on 
  
Rapture Ready falls into the trap that Derby avoided: it correlates contemporary politics with 
bible prophecy. 
 
The Rapture Index: content  
Although the website ceased to exist as the Rapture Index in 1995, the index has continued to 
play an important part in the popularity of the site, and much of the publicity that the site 
generates can be put down to interest in the index. In 2002 Nancy Gibbs included it in the 
Time magazine cover story ‘Apocalypse Now’; and Matt Taibbi endorsed it in his blog in 
Rolling Stone magazine (Aug 2011). 
The index was designed to provide what Strandberg believed to be a way of 
consistently correlating a variety of events into an organised indicator of end time signs. 
Thus, as a result of a fascination with geo-political events and biblical prophecy the 45 
categories listed below were drawn up to form the Rapture Index: 
1. False Christs  
2. Occult  
3. Satanism  
4. Unemployment  
5. Inflation  
6. Interest Rates  
7. The Economy  
8. Oil Supply/Price  
9. Debt & Trade  
10. Financial unrest  
11. Leadership  
12. Drug abuse  
13. Apostasy  
14. Supernatural  
15. Moral Standards  
16. Anti-Christian  
17. Crime Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Ecumenism  
19. Globalism  
20. Tribulation Temple  
21. Anti-Semitism  
22. Israel  
23. Gog (Russia)  
24. Persia (Iran)  
25. False Prophet  
26. Nuclear Nations  
27. Global Turmoil  
28. Arms Proliferation  
29. Liberalism  
30. Peace Process  
31. Kings of the East  
32. Mark of the Beast  
33. Beast Government  
34. The Antichrist  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Date Settings  
36. Volcanoes  
37. Earthquakes  
38. Wild Weather  
39. Civil Rights  
40. Famine  
41. Drought  
42. Plagues  
43. Climate  
44. Food Supply  
45. Floods17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Each category has a rating between 1 and 5, with 1 being low and 5 high. Updated weekly, 
the category ratings are aggregated with the total providing an indicator as to how near the 
rapture could be. Below are the numerical bands by which so-called prophetic activity is 
measured:  
Rapture Index of 100 and below — slow prophetic activity 
Rapture Index of 100 to 130 — moderate prophetic activity  
Rapture Index of 130 to 160 — heavy prophetic activity  
Rapture Index above 160 — fasten your seat belts18 
 
The influence of (late) modernity is readily evident. The form the index takes is a statistical 
hypothesis test: a test which attempts to establish the likelihood of a rapture occurring 
depending on specific global circumstances. This method of testing was established in the 
mid-twentieth century and is commonly used in assessing contemporary risks.19 
The 45 categories that comprise the index can be split into two types: those associated 
with biblical imagery and language; second, those influenced by contemporary socio-
economic and political terms that have emerged through the process of modernity. Categories 
in the former include: ‘mark of the beast’; ‘kings of the east’; ‘Gog’; ‘false prophets’ and ‘the 
anti-Christ’. Surprisingly, given that the site promotes the supremacy of an inerrant bible 
these categories are in the minority.20 Instead, the majority of the 45 categories comprise the 
second type and include: ‘unemployment’; ‘inflation’; ‘interest rates’; ‘the economy’; ‘oil 
supply/price’; ‘crime rate’; ‘nuclear nations’; ‘arms proliferation’; ‘global turmoil’; ‘civil 
rights’ and ‘financial unrest’. Indeed, they might be regarded as symbols that are brought to 
us through the intensity and immediacy of media (Silverstone 2007: 27). Despite the 
influence of J N Derby being prevalent in some of the dispensationalist theology recognised 
  
in much of the teaching on Rapture Ready the adoption of such categories and the premise 
behind the Rapture Index is incongruent with Derby’s theology.  
A rationale is also provided for what are deemed the ‘active categories’ on the 
index.21 This includes categories that are considered to have diminished in terms of 
importance as well as those that are reckoned to be live and making global headlines. At the 
time of writing22 an example of the former would be category 24—Iran (Persia). The 
explanation reads the ‘The lack of activity has downgraded this category.’23  In terms of the 
more active, category 23—Gog (Russia) indicates the seriousness of the matter. The 
explanation reads, ‘Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has maxed this category out.’24  Other typical 
explanations given for activity include category 8—oil supply/price states: ‘Cold weather is 
driving up fuel prices’25; and category 10—financial unrest states: ‘Financial markets remain 
oddly stable in the face of numerous warning signs.’26 The ambiguity of these descriptors 
suggests a tension between, on the one hand, providing too accurate a rationale that might 
easily be dismissed as false prophecy: thus, allowing for flexibility and fluidity in the 
interpretation of such data. On the other hand, this abstruseness aids in facilitating the 
proclivity to correlate such signs with the end times.  
This individualistic and subjective approach to the construction, categorisation and 
handling of such data on the index point toward traces of the individualism suggested by 
Beck and others that are prevalent in a world risk society. To be more precise in terms of 
Beck’s typologies of risk it represents the fourth outlined above: the outworking of 
biographical risks associated with radical individualism (Beck 2009: 13). As globalisation 
disrupts the terrain of everyday life and dissolves boundaries individualisation emerges, with 
the corollary of this being that there is a reaction to re-enforce boundaries (including religious 
ones). It is a catalyst for individualisation that can become ‘a quest for fundamental 
certainties, authoritarian truths, [and] absolute sovereignties’ (Comaroff 2010: 24), which in 
  
the case of the Rapture Index (and Rapture Ready as a whole) is evident. The need to 
specifically class signs of the rapture reveals the grappling with the socio-political issues of 
the day and in doing so attempt to re-enforce ontological security; an ontological security that 
can only materialise through promulgating the certainty of Christ’s imminent return. Fuelled 
by the almost boundless connectivity and accessibility to the latest breaking events locally 
and globally that new media facilitates, it is an example of the influence and impact that late 
modernity (world risk society) has on society. What is presented is the unease of an outlook 
that reflects and indicates an awareness of risk and reacts in an alarmist fashion to it.   
  Such uncertainty, induced by individualisation encourages the emergence of lay 
experts who come to the fore as trust in institutions is eroded. The cobbling together of new 
biographies brought about by the enforced self-regulatory environment of late modernity 
encourages the cultivation of lay experts (Anderson 2003: 45). Strandberg, with no formal 
theological qualifications, epitomises this shift toward the individualisation of religion in the 
twenty-first century. With a bible in one hand and his laptop in the other, undertaking 
searches of current socio-political affairs, he exemplifies individualisation in the global 
village. Selecting what he regards as indicators that are relevant to a dispensationalist 
worldview he positions himself as a guardian of that tradition. 
Further, the products and processes of globalisation play a critical role in the existence 
of the Rapture Index: indeed, it is dependent on them. There are two basic reasons for this. 
First, one of the drivers of globalisation, namely digital media technology, has been 
extremely well utilised by many fundamentalist groups. Without the oxygen of globalisation 
and the concurrent rise of new technologies, many fundamentalist groups would not exist 
(Mendelsohn 1992; Giddens 2000). Hoover and Kaneva (2009: 3) go as far as to argue that 
‘fundamentalisms cannot be fully understood without reference to the media. They are all 
movements of what we might call “the media age.”’ Neither would this mode of foretelling 
  
the proximity of the rapture be possible, both in terms of scope and in the rapid and 
instantaneous ability to interpret events as they break nationally and internationally, without 
this technology. Globalisation shrinks the world in which we live and digital technology 
facilitates the speed upon which we can respond politically, economically, physically, 
emotionally, and even faithfully to such developments. Such informationalisation through 
networks expedites the productive capacity of knowledge (Castells 2010: 72) and enables 
swift dissemination of information.  
Second, it is not just that the Rapture Index would not exist without such technology 
but most of the actual content—the classifications —are a direct consequence of the 
processes of globalisation without which it would be impossible to populate in such a 
manner. The categories cited above are all contingent upon globalisation, and are codes for 
the flows of capital, goods, technology and services in a globalised world (Castells 2010: 
303).  
What is also apparent is an internal conflict that often occurs within fundamentalist 
groups when utilising and engaging with modern technology and the productions and 
processes of modernisation more generally. On the one hand there is collaboration with the 
products of a globalised modernity; on the other hand, there is also either a reticence to 
accept it, and/or modification of such productions (Campbell, 2010). Here, one might 
usefully employ Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai’s expression of ‘cultured technology’ when 
attempting to extrapolate the uses of such technology within fundamentalist groups (2005). It 
is manipulated and modified to serve the good of the tradition: it is a means to an end.  
What is significant is the paradoxical position of both embracing and rejecting 
elements or derivative terms associated with globalisation. These contradictory dynamics are 
exemplified in, for example, the two categories, ‘globalism’27 and ‘global turmoil’ found on 
  
the index. Apart from being ambiguous classifications, both expose the reliance upon and 
rejection of globalisation. ‘Globalism’ and the closely linked ‘global turmoil’ are regarded as 
key indicators for the nearness of the rapture. This is due in part to a belief that globalism will 
ultimately force global political systems to form a One World Government (Robertson 1991; 
Barkun 2006: 39-64). It is also understood in negative terms as are all the classifications: the 
greater the global turmoil and the increasingly complex hegemonic tendency of globalisation 
(particularly with the emergence of Eastern economic powers), the nearer Christ’s return. 
From this dispensationalist perspective societal crises are often understood within a fatalistic 
framework: especially those that are deemed as uncontrollable (Wojcik 1997).  Of course, the 
paradox is that the products and processes of globalisation are essential for this worldview in 
disseminating the message and pointing toward the rapture. Globalisation has to happen. One 
might argue it is part of the divine plan. As Daniel Wojcik (1997: 136) observes, ‘religious 
apocalypticists attribute these current calamities to liberalism, and the evils of the modern 
world, but ultimately regard these crises as a meaningful part of God’s end times scenario.’  
Globalisation, individualisation and the concept of risk are three elements that 
comprise reflexive modernisation which, in turn, constitutes world risk society. The effects of 
reflexive modernisation are clearly manifest in the Rapture Index. They are exemplified in 
the weekly grading of the classifications the majority of which are either indirectly or directly 
manifestations of the typologies of risk outlined by Beck. The index represents a form of 
popular-dispensationalism that reacts to global events which are regarded and interpreted as 
possible catastrophes in the making. This is exacerbated by the dynamics of world risk 
society.  
To underline the explicit influence of world risk society on this expression of 
eschatology, it is worth recalling the pitfalls Derby wanted to avoid. In classical 
dispensationalist teaching the church age (sixth dispensation) is known as ‘The Great 
  
Parenthesis’; this means that the current time period in which believers in Christ find 
themselves is a time where biblical prophecy is suspended. It is pointless undertaking any 
millennial arithmetic (Weber 2004: 47); moreover, and significantly, it is futile to equate 
biblical prophecy to events currently taking place in the world. As Mark Sweetnam (2006: 
180) rightly notes, ‘This insistence on a period in which no prophecy would be fulfilled is 
essential to dispensationalism …’ The prophetic clock has stopped ticking. Although the 
rapture has to occur, until it does, no amount of pseudo-intellectual gymnastics can possibly 
determine what will happen and when. Most importantly, the classical dispensationalist 
position did not react to the trends, fashions and fads of society, nor did Derby and those 
affiliated with this teaching attempt to sensationalise prophecy interpretation by aligning it 
directly with contemporary events. The linking of biblical prophecy with global events is a 
clear departure from classical dispensational teaching. The Rapture Index and the wider 
teaching on the host site Rapture Ready represent a development in dispensational theology 
that has not been able to resist the external pressures of late modernity. It is not the first 
example to succumb to this. Although there are many examples of dispensationalists who 
have been seduced by the technological advances of late modernity28 Hal Lindsey is probably 
the most notable. His best-selling, The Late Great Planet Earth (1973), according to Glen 
Shuck (2011: 522), ‘reads as a trendy prophecy manual’ which relentlessly links prophecy to 
current affairs. In Lindsey’s own words (1973: 306), ‘To the sceptic who says that Christ is 
not coming soon, I would ask him [sic] to put the book of Revelation in one hand and the 
daily newspaper in the other, and then sincerely ask God to show him where we are on his 
prophetic time-clock.’  
  
The Rapture Index as Gnostic Non-Knowing in Risk Society 
  
This particular example of dispensationalism is indebted to the processes of late modernity 
and specifically to the idea of world risk society. There is also a further link to Beck’s world 
risk society thesis that re-affirms this argument. The categories which form the index, centred 
on the interpretation of global-political events, are based on a lack of knowledge: of non-
knowing. In world risk society non-knowing has arisen as a result of the progress of science 
and technology. For example, scientists might be able to determine certain risks with regard 
the use of microwave ovens or mobile phones or how much red wine can be drunk per week 
through statistical probability calculation. However, they fail to accurately diagnose long 
term affects because of a lack of evidence, and any advice is often overruled by further 
contradictory expert advice or research. Advances in science do not necessarily equate to less 
risk. This is demonstrated through regular changes in prognosis: it is a result of non-knowing. 
Non-knowing rules in the risk society (Beck 2009: 115).  
With this particular pseudo-scientific approach to interpreting bible prophecy in the 
form of the Rapture Index, events are graded according to the intensity of their global 
ramifications. On the basis of this, approximations are offered in the form of a figure of 
probability as to how close the rapture may be. In effect what is happening is that their 
understanding of biblical prophecy serves as a subservient part of a larger interpretive 
framework that is dominated by the signs, symbols and technologies of world risk society. It 
is through this framework that Strandberg sees the world and determines the magnitude 
(normally in terms of severity, hardship, death and destruction) of global events and 
catastrophes. Despite claiming an inerrant bible as the basis from which to judge the signs of 
the times, the pressure the external influences of risk place upon interpretation is clear. 
Moreover, the certainties that the signs of the end times are near are constantly delayed in the 
continuing non-appearance of Christ. This is a form of what Beck would describe as 
unintentional or unconscious non-knowing (2009: 126).  
  
 
This is not an example of cognitive dissonance because no actual date-setting is 
proffered. Rather, as suggested above, there is a degree of flexibility within the eschatological 
framework which allows for what Howard calls narrative plasticity (2006) which 
demonstrates ‘the limited horizon of a form of knowledge that does not reflect on its own 
limits. One does not know what one does not know’ (Beck 2009: 126). This is a symptom of 
world risk society. The Rapture Index is a chronological narrative of non-knowing. Perhaps 
even gnostic non-knowing. Gnostic in this context does not refer to a particular system of 
beliefs that can be grouped under the term Gnosticism dating back to the second and third 
centuries; rather, it refers to claims of truth that comes through inner experience or even 
revelation (Hanegraaf 1996: 519).29 The guardians of beleaguered tradition who have the 
authority to interpret the signs of the times assume an almost gnostic status in terms of their 
interpretation of texts and events. It is the calling and remit of only a select few guardians of 
the tradition, or elites. The non-knowing is evidenced in the repeated fluctuations of the 
Rapture Index that rises with reported global turmoil and unrest, and the greater the potential 
catastrophe that might point the way to the rapture, the greater the non-knowing is exposed as 
the rapture fails to materialise. To repeat Beck’s (2009: 115) phrase with regard world risk 
society: ‘non-knowledge rules.’ The greater the catastrophe, the greater the tendency to ramp 
up the tension and as a consequence the index; however, the greater the catastrophe the 
greater the non-knowing. This typifies Beck and Wehling’s (2012: 38) summary of the 
unawareness of non-knowing: ‘It…remains unknown that one does not know something and 
what one does not know.’ 
There is something else going on here in terms of knowledge that is similar to what 
Scott Lash refers to as disinformation society. For Lash there are two types of information. 
The first is associated with the discursive and rational, and is about the shift to a knowledge-
  
intensive society (Lash 2002: 141). It is gained through training that demands ‘distant 
reflection and chronic problematization’ (2002: 141) and a Cartesian mind-set. The second 
type of information is more to do with information culture and is very different to the former 
but could not exist without it. This type of information found in information culture—an 
unintended consequence of information society—is ‘the out-of-control anarchy of 
information diffusion’, the result of which is ‘an informational aesthetics of the monstrous’ 
(Lash 2002: 146). The crucial point regarding the development of the Rapture Index is it is 
the product of an information culture that has spiralled out of control in the face of the 
intensification of media saturation, and is an example of the misappropriation of information 
that is a consequence of the world risk society. It is the decontextualisation and then 
recontexualisation of information in an apocalyptic framework that, imbued with a fatalistic 
worldview, is aided and abetted by the impregnation of risk into the psyche of western 
culture.  
  
Conclusion     
In summary, I have suggested that the Rapture Index is representative of a distorted mutation 
of the traditional theological position of classical dispensationalism. Due to the existential 
angst prevalent in contemporary world risk society, popular dispensationalists have conflated 
the important theological difference between Christ’s appearance in the rapture and the actual 
second coming. Erroneously linking current global-political and economic events with 
biblical prophecy has produced a caricatured and sensationalist version of dispensationalism. 
Reminding ourselves of Beck’s three logics of contemporary risk society: ecological, 
financial and terrorist, it is clear that these actually take centre stage in the Rapture Index. 
  
This is a reflection of the anxiety that is prevalent in western society through the lens of a 
fundamentalist website.  
The point is that the Rapture Index has been set up in order to demonstrate, not only 
to regular users of the site and rapture believers but a potential global audience, how world 
issues relate to bible prophecy; and, in this instance, the rapture of the Church and the end of 
the world as we know it. It is an example of an attempt to ‘immanentize the eschaton’, to 
borrow Eric Voegelin’s phrase.30 In a globalising world that asks for reasons for why things 
happen, this form of fundamentalism attempts to provide ontological certainty in an uncertain 
and turbulent risk society but in the end it is ultimately a product of it.  
  
Bibliography 
Adam, B. 1996. “Detraditionalization and the Certainty of Uncertain Futures.” In 
Detraditionalization, edited by P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris, 134-148. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Anderson, J. W. 2003. “The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters.” In New Media in the 
Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, edited by D. F. Eickelman and J. W. Anderson, 
45-60. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Barzilai-Nahon, K. and G. Barzilai. 2005. “Cultured Technology: Internet and religious 
Fundamentalism.” The Information Society 21 (1): 25-40. 
Barkun, M. 2006. A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bauman, Z. 1991. Modernity and Ambivalence. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Bauman, Z. 1998. “Postmodern Religion?” In Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity, edited 
by P. Heelas, D. Martin and Paul Morris, 55-78. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Bauman, Z. 2011. Collateral Damage: Social Inequalities in a Global Age. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Baert and F. D. Rubio. 2012. The Politics of Knowledge. London: Routledge. 
Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. 
Beck, U. 1995. Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, U. 2009. A God of One’s Own. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, U., A. Giddens, and S. Lash. 1994. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. London: Polity Press. 
  
Beck, U. and P. Wehling. 2012. “The Politics of Non-Knowing: An Emerging Area of Social 
and Political Conflict in Reflexive Modernity.” In The Politics of Knowledge, edited by P. 
Baert and F. D. Rubio, 33-57. London: Routledge.  
Bernstein, P. L. 1998. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Blastland, M. and D. Spiegelhalter. 2013. The Norm Chronicles: Stories and Numbers about 
Danger. London: Profile Books. 
Bruce, S. 2008. Fundamentalism. London: Polity Press. 
Boyer, P. 1992. When Time Shall be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Breakwell, G. 2007. The Psychology of Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, H. 2010. When Religion Meets New Media. London: Routledge.  
Carrette, J and R. King. 2004. Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion. London: 
Routledge. 
Castells, M. 2010. The Power of Identity. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Comaroff, J. 2010. “The Politics of Conviction: Faith on the Neo-Liberal Frontier.” In 
Contemporary Religiosities: Emergent Socialities and the Post-Nation State, edited by B. 
Kapferer, K. Telle, and A. Eriksen, 17-38. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Davie, G. 2013. The Sociology of Religion: A Critical Agenda. London: Sage. 
Douglas, M. 1970. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. 
London: Routledge. 
Douglas, M. 1992. Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory. London: Routledge. 
  
Douglas, M and A. Wildavsky. 1983. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of 
Technological Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dyer, C. 1990. The Rise of Babylon. Wheaton: Tyndale. 
Elliott, A. 2002. “Beck’s Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment.” Sociology 36 (2): 293-
315. 
Furedi, F. 2006. Culture of Fear Re-Visited. London: Continuum. 
Furlong, A. and F. Cartmel. 1997. Young People and Social Change: Individualization and 
Risk in Late Modernity. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Gibbs, N. 2002. “Apocalypse Now!”  (Time, July 1st 2002) 
Giddens, A. 1991. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. 1998. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Giddens, A. 1999. “Risk and Responsibility.” The Modern Law Review 62 (1): 1-10. 
Giddens, A. 2002. Runaway World: How Globalisation is Re-Shaping Our Lives. London: 
Profile Books.  
Hanegraaff, H. 1996. New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of 
Secular Thought. New York: New York University Press. 
Harskamp, van, A. 2008. “Existential Insecurity and New Religiosity: An Essay on some 
Religion-Making Characteristics of Modernity.” Social Compass 1: 1-19. 
Heelas, P., S. Lash, and P. Morris, eds. 1995. Detraditionalization. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hervieu-Leger, D. 2000. Religion as a Chain of Memory. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  
Hoover, S. M. and N. Kaneva, eds. 2009. Fundamentalisms and the Media. London: 
Continuum.  
Howard, R. G. 2006. “Sustainability and Narrative Plasticity in Online Apocalyptic 
Discourse After September 11, 2001.” Journal of Media and Religion 5 (1): 25-47. 
Hunt. D. 1990. Global Peace and the Rise of the Antichrist. Eugene, Ore: Harvest House. 
Kapferer, B., K. Telle and A. Eriksen, eds. 2010. Contemporary Religiosities: Emergent 
Socialities and the Post-Nation State. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Kaplin, L., ed. 1992. Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective. Mass: University of 
Massachusetts Press.  
Lash, S. 2002. Critique of Information. London: Sage. 
Lash, S. 2010. Intensive Culture. London: Sage. 
Lindsey, H. with C. C. Carlson. 1970. The Late Great Planet Earth. Basingstoke: Marshall 
Pickering.  
Linsdey, H. 1973. There’s a New World Coming: A Prophetic Odyssey. Santa Ana: Vision 
House Publishers. 
Lupton, D. 2013. Risk. 2nd ed. London: Routledge 
Luhmann, N. 1993. Risk: A Sociological Theory. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Lyon, D. 1999. Postmodernity. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Lyon, D. 2000. Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Marsden, G. 1991. Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism. Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing. 
  
Marty, M. E. and R. S. Appleby, eds. 1993. “Introduction.” In Fundamentalisms Observed. 
The Fundamentalist Project, vol. 1, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, vii-xvi.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Marty, M. E. and R. S. Appleby, eds. 1993. Fundamentalisms and Society. The 
Fundamentalism Project, vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
McGuigan, J. 2005. Modernity and Postmodern Culture. 2nd ed. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Mendelsohn, E. 1993. “Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences.” In Fundamentalisms 
and Society. The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 2, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, 
23-41. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Mitszel, B. and A. Shupe. 1992. “Making Sense of the Global Revival of Fundamantalism.” 
In Religion and Politics in Comparative Persepctive: Revival of Religious Fundamentalism in 
East and West, edited by B. Mitszel, and A. Shupe, 3-9. Santa Barbara: Praeger. 
Mythen, G. 2004. Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. London: Pluto 
Press.  
Partridge, C., ed. 2000. Fundamentalisms. Carlisle: Paternoster Press.  
Robertson, P. 1991. The New World Order. Milton Keynes: Word (UK). 
Shuck G. W. 2011. “Christian Dispensationalism.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Millennialism, edited by C. Wessinger, 515-528. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Silverstone, R. 2007. Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis. London: Polity 
Press. 
  
Solomon, S. 1999. “Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Review of Concepts of History.” 
Review of Geophysics 37 (3): 275-316. 
Strandberg, T. and T. James. 2004. Are You Rapture Ready? Signs, Prophecies, Warnings, 
Threats, and Suspicions that the Endtime is Now. London: Plume. 
Strozier, C. B., D. M. Terman, and J. Jones. 2010. The Fundamentalist Mindset. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Sweetnam, M. 2006. “Tensions in Dispensational Eschatology.” In Expecting the End: 
Millennialism in Social and Historical Context, edited by K. G. C. Newport and C. Gribben, 
173-192. Waco: Baylor University Press.   
Taibbi, M. 2011. “GOP Hearts End-Times Insanity.” On Taibblog Rolling Stone. Accessed 
5th June 2014. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/gop-hearts-end-times-
insanity-20110830.  
Thompson, J. B. 1996. “Tradition and Self in a Mediated World.” In Detraditionalization, 
edited by P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris, 89-1-8. Oxford: Blackwell, 89-108. 
Turner, B. 1994. Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism. London: Routledge. 
Voegelin, E. 1952. The New Science of Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Walvoord, J. F. 1980. The Rapture Question. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
Weber, T. 2004. On the Road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals Became Israel’s Best 
Friend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 
Wessinger, C., ed. 2011. The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
  
Whisenant, E. 1988. 88 Reasons Why the Rapture Will be in 1988. Edgar Whisenant 
Publishers.  
Wittgenstein, L. 1991. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wojcik, D. 1997. The End of the World as We Know It: Faith, Fatalism and Apoclaypse in 
America. New York: New York University Press. 
Wuthnow, R. 2010. Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Response to Terror, Pandemics, 
Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation and Other Threats. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
1 See Solomon, S. (1999). Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Review of Concepts and History, in 
Review of Geophysics 37: 3, pp. 275-316. 
2 The Rapture Index is one part of the website www.raptureready.com.  
3 A case in point is the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, which geographically affected thousands of square 
miles, well beyond the borders of what was the former USSR. Furthermore, the risks of radiation from 
the nuclear plant are likely to remain for hundreds of years meaning there will be ‘future’ casualties of 
this catastrophe. 
4 Other risks, for example, would include damage to the ozone layer and nuclear power. 
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6 See L. Wittgenstein 2001. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell for the concept of ‘family 
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http://raptureready.com/rap33.html accessed 28.05.14. 
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12 http://www.raptureready.com/ accessed 29.04.14. 
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22 May 2014. 
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Dyer, 1991), 
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modernity. I utilise the term in a more general and non-pejorative sense that captures some of what 
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